/*
 * safepath: safe path traversal for POSIX systems
 * Copyright 2022 Kaz Kylheku <kaz@kylheku.com>
 *
 * BSD-2 License
 *
 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are met:
 *
 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice,
 *    this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
 *
 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice,
 *    this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation
 *    and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
 *
 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS"
 * AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT HOLDER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE
 * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR
 * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF
 * SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS
 * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN
 * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE
 * POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
 */

#include <string.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <pwd.h>
#include <grp.h>
#include <regex.h>
#include "safepath.h"

/*
 * Regular expressions used by abs_path_check.
 */

static const char *bad_proc = {
  "^/proc/([0-9]+|self)/(cwd|root|map_files|fd/[0-9]+|task/[0-9]+/(cwd|root|fd/[0-9]+))($|/)"
};
static regex_t bad_proc_rx;

/*
 * Returns non-zero if st informs about an object that is not writable by
 * anyone other than the real user ID of the process, or else the superuser.
 */
static int safe_group(gid_t gid)
{
  char buf_root[256], buf_real[256], buf_grp[256];
  struct passwd pw_root, *pwr, pw_real, *pwu;
  struct group grp, *pgr;
  int i;

  /* Obtain passwd info about root user, to get at the name. */
  if (getpwuid_r(0, &pw_root, buf_root, sizeof buf_root, &pwr) < 0 ||
      pwr == 0)
  {
    return 0;
  }

  /* Obtain passwd info about effective user ID, to get at the name. */
  if (getpwuid_r(geteuid(), &pw_real, buf_real, sizeof buf_real, &pwu) < 0 ||
      pwu == 0)
  {
    return 0;
  }

  /* Obtain group info. */
  if (getgrgid_r(gid, &grp, buf_grp, sizeof buf_grp, &pgr) < 0 ||
      pgr == 0)
  {
    return 0;
  }

  /* Check that the group contains no member names other than
   * the root user or the real user.
   */
  for (i = 0; ; i++) {
    if (pgr->gr_mem[i] == 0)
      break;
    if (strcmp(pgr->gr_mem[i], pwr->pw_name) != 0 &&
        strcmp(pgr->gr_mem[i], pwu->pw_name) != 0)
      return 0;
  }

  return 1;
}

/*
 * Returns non-zero if st informs about an object that is not writable by
 * anyone other than the real user ID of the process, or else the superuser.
 */
static int tamper_proof(const struct stat *st)
{
  /* Owner isn't caller or root; that owner could
   * change the permissions to whatever they want
   * and modify the object.
   */
  if (st->st_uid != 0 && st->st_uid != geteuid())
    return 0;

  /* Ownership is good, but permissions are open; object is writable to
   * group owner or others. That could still be safe.
   */
  if ((st->st_mode & (S_IWGRP | S_IWOTH)) != 0) {
    /* Is this a directory owned by root, which has the sticky bit, such
     * as /tmp? That's OK.
     */
    if (S_ISDIR(st->st_mode) && (st->st_mode & S_ISVTX) != 0)
      return 1;
    /* Check for some situations of just the group permissions
     * being open, not others.
     */
    if ((st->st_mode & (S_IWGRP | S_IWOTH)) == S_IWGRP) {
      /* The group owner is the superuser group.
       * That is OK.
       */
      if (st->st_gid == 0)
        return 1;

      /* Otherwise, we do a complicated check
       */
      return safe_group(st->st_gid);
    }
    return 0;
  } else {
    return 1;
  }
}

/*
 * Get rid of .. and . components, without filesystem access.
 * Returns malloced string.
 */
static char *simplify_path(const char *ipath)
{
  char *opath = malloc(strlen(ipath) + 1);

  if (opath != 0) {
    size_t ipos = 0, opos = 0;

    opath[ipos] = 0;

    if (ipath[ipos] == '/') {
      opath[opos++] = ipath[ipos++];
      opath[ipos] = 0;
    }

    for (;;) {
      size_t complen = strcspn(ipath + ipos, "/");

      if (complen == 2 && strncmp(ipath + ipos, "..", 2) == 0 && opos > 0) {
        int ppos = opos - 1;
        size_t pcomplen = 0;

        while (ppos > 0 && opath[ppos - 1] != '/') {
          ppos--;
          pcomplen++;
        }

        if (pcomplen > 0 && (pcomplen != 2 ||
                             strncmp(ipath + ppos, "..", 2) != 0))
        {
          opos = ppos;
          opath[opos] = 0;
          goto nextcomp;
        } else {
          goto copy;
        }
      } else if ((complen == 1 && ipath[ipos] == '.') ||
                 complen == 0)
      {
        goto nextcomp;
      }

    copy:
      strncat(opath + opos, ipath + ipos, complen);
      opos += complen;
      if (ipath[ipos + complen]) {
        strcat(opath + opos, "/");
        opos++;
      }
    nextcomp:
      ipos += complen;
      if (ipath[ipos] == 0)
        break;
      ipos++;
    }
  }

  return opath;
}

/*
 * Checks for some known system paths that can be attack vectors.
 */
static int abs_path_check(const char *abspath)
{
  /* The /proc/<pid>/cwd symlink cannot be trusted by root, because an
   * unprivileged user can use the "su" executable to point that anywhere.
   * Non-root cannot access that symlink, and so is safe from it.
   */
  char *sabspath = simplify_path(abspath);
  int res = regexec(&bad_proc_rx, sabspath, 0, NULL, 0);
  free(sabspath);
  return res != 0;
}

static int safepath_err(int eno)
{
  switch (eno) {
  case 0:
    return SAFEPATH_OK;
  case ENOENT:
    return SAFEPATH_NOENT;
  case ENOTDIR:
    return SAFEPATH_NOTDIR;
  case EPERM:
  case EACCES:
    return SAFEPATH_PERM;
  case ENOMEM:
    return SAFEPATH_NOMEM;
  case ELOOP:
    return SAFEPATH_LOOP;
  default:
    return SAFEPATH_INVAL;
  }
}

static void set_errno(int spres)
{
  switch (spres) {
  case SAFEPATH_OK:
    break;
  case SAFEPATH_UNSAFE:
    errno = EACCES;
    break;
  case SAFEPATH_PERM:
    errno = EPERM;
    break;
  case SAFEPATH_NOENT:
    errno = ENOENT;
    break;
  case SAFEPATH_NOTDIR:
    errno = ENOTDIR;
    break;
  case SAFEPATH_INVAL:
    errno = EINVAL;
    break;
  case SAFEPATH_NOMEM:
    errno = ENOMEM;
    break;
  case SAFEPATH_LOOP:
    errno = ELOOP;
    break;
  }
}

/*
 *  Must be called exactly once before safepath_check is used.
 *  Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure.
 */
int safepath_init(void)
{
  if (regcomp(&bad_proc_rx, bad_proc, REG_EXTENDED | REG_NOSUB) != 0)
    return 0;
  return 1;
}

/*
 *  If safepath_init was was successfully called, this may be called once to
 *  release the resources allocated by safepath_init.
 *  The library may not be used after that.
 *  A new call to safepath_init is permitted after safepath_cleanup.
 */
void safepath_cleanup(void)
{
  regfree(&bad_proc_rx);
  memset(&bad_proc_rx, 0, sizeof bad_proc_rx);
}

int safepath_check(const char *name)
{
  struct stat st;
  int abs = (*name == '/');
  const char *start = abs ? "/" : ".";
  size_t pos = strspn(name, "/"); /* skip all leading slashes */
  char *copy;
  int ret = SAFEPATH_OK, count = 0, root_checked = abs;

  /* empty name is invalid */
  if (*name == 0) {
    ret = SAFEPATH_INVAL;
    goto out;
  }

  /* check absolute path for known vulnerabilities. */
  if (abs && !abs_path_check(name)) {
    ret = SAFEPATH_UNSAFE;
    goto out;
  }

  /* check starting directory */
  if (stat(start, &st) < 0) {
    ret = safepath_err(errno);
    goto out;
  }

  if (!tamper_proof(&st)) {
    ret = SAFEPATH_UNSAFE;
    goto out;
  }

  /* check if that was the whole path */
  if (name[pos] == 0) {
    ret = SAFEPATH_OK;
    goto out;
  }

  /* now process path */
  if ((copy = strdup(name)) == 0) {
    ret = SAFEPATH_NOMEM;
    goto out;
  }

  while (copy[pos] != 0) {
    size_t nxslash = pos + strcspn(copy + pos, "/");
    int savechar = copy[nxslash];

    if (savechar) {
      while (copy[nxslash + 1] == '/')
        nxslash++;
    }

    /* null terminate the path at the next slash */
    copy[nxslash] = 0;

    /* use lstat in case the component is a symlink */
    if (lstat(copy, &st) < 0) {
      ret = safepath_err(errno);
      goto free_out;
    }

    /* If it is a symlink, we can trust it because we validated the
     * previous component, which is the directory it lives in. However,
     * we trust only that link, and not what it points to.  It could
     * point to another link which is not secured against tampering.
     * Thus, we must implement symlink resolution right here ourselves:
     * replace the symlink component with its expansion and continue
     * checking the expansion, component by component.
     */
    if (S_ISLNK(st.st_mode)) {
      char link[256];
      int len;

      if (++count > 8) {
        ret = SAFEPATH_LOOP;
        goto free_out;
      }

      /* We check the symlink ownership and declare a symlink
       * not owned by us or root to be unsafe. This is particularly
       * important in the case when the previous component is a
       * sticky directory which we declared safe, similar to /tmp.
       * Multiple users can create symlinks in /tmp or a /tmp-like
       * directory, which could be used to subvert this function.
       */
      if (st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != geteuid()) {
        ret = SAFEPATH_UNSAFE;
        goto free_out;
      }

      /* A symlink with a link count > 1 is suspicious; it looks like a
       * hard link attack: an attacker hard linking a symlink into a
       * /tmp-like directory.
       */
      if (st.st_nlink > 1) {
        ret = SAFEPATH_UNSAFE;
        goto free_out;
      }

      if ((len = readlink(copy, link, sizeof link)) < 0) {
        ret = safepath_err(errno);
        goto free_out;
      }

      if (len == 0) {
        ret = SAFEPATH_INVAL;
        goto free_out;
      } else if (len == sizeof link) {
        ret = SAFEPATH_TOOLONG;
        goto free_out;
      }

      link[len] = 0;

      /* Resolve the symlink, using two different cases based
       * on whether the target is absolute or relative.
       * Either way it's string grafting.
       */
      if (link[0] == '/') {
        /* Check absolute path for known vulnerabilities. */
        if (!abs_path_check(link)) {
          ret = SAFEPATH_UNSAFE;
          goto free_out;

        }
        /* We have to check the root directory, if we have
         * not done so before.
         */
        if (!root_checked) {
          if (stat("/", &st) < 0) {
            ret = safepath_err(errno);
            goto free_out;
          }
          root_checked = 1;
        }

        /* If savechar is zero, we are working with the last component.
         * If the last component is an absolute symlink, we just replace
         * the path with the target, and iterate.  Otherwise, we must
         * graft the remainder of the path onto the symlink target.
         */
        if (savechar == 0) {
          free(copy);
          if ((copy = strdup(link)) == NULL) {
            ret = SAFEPATH_NOMEM;
            goto out;
          }
          pos = strspn(copy, "/");
          continue;
        } else {
          size_t total = len + 1 + strlen(copy + nxslash + 1) + 1;
          char *resolved = malloc(total);
          if (resolved == NULL) {
            ret = SAFEPATH_NOMEM;
            goto free_out;
          }
          strcpy(resolved, link);
          if (link[len - 1] != '/') {
            resolved[len] = '/';
            strcpy(resolved + len + 1, copy + nxslash + 1);
          } else {
            strcpy(resolved + len, copy + nxslash + 1);
          }
          free(copy);
          copy = resolved;
          pos = strspn(copy, "/");
          continue;
        }
      } else {
        if (savechar == 0) {
          size_t total = pos + len + 1;
          char *resolved = malloc(total);
          if (resolved == NULL) {
            ret = SAFEPATH_NOMEM;
            goto free_out;
          }
          memcpy(resolved, copy, pos);
          strcpy(resolved + pos, link);
          free(copy);
          copy = resolved;
          continue;
        } else {
          size_t total = pos + len + 1 + strlen(copy + nxslash + 1) + 1;
          char *resolved = malloc(total);
          if (resolved == NULL) {
            ret = SAFEPATH_NOMEM;
            goto free_out;
          }
          memcpy(resolved, copy, pos);
          strcpy(resolved + pos, link);
          if (link[len - 1] != '/') {
            resolved[pos + len] = '/';
            strcpy(resolved + pos + len + 1, copy + nxslash + 1);
          } else {
            strcpy(resolved + pos + len, copy + nxslash + 1);
          }
          free(copy);
          copy = resolved;
          continue;
        }
      }
    }

    /* Not symlink: check if it's safe
     * and move to next component, if any.
     */
    if (!tamper_proof(&st)) {
      ret = SAFEPATH_UNSAFE;
      goto free_out;
    }

    /* Undo null termination */
    copy[nxslash] = savechar;

    /* Start search for next slash after current slash;
     * but not if nxslash is actually at the end of the string
     */
    pos = nxslash + (savechar != 0);
  }

free_out:
  free(copy);
out:
  return ret;
}

const char *safepath_strerr(int err)
{
  const char *str[] = {
    [SAFEPATH_OK]       = "path appears safe",
    [SAFEPATH_UNSAFE]   = "path contains untrusted component",
    [SAFEPATH_PERM]     = "path contains inaccessible component",
    [SAFEPATH_NOENT]    = "path contains nonexistent component",
    [SAFEPATH_NOTDIR]   = "path contains non-directory component",
    [SAFEPATH_INVAL]    = "path is syntactically invalid",
    [SAFEPATH_NOMEM]    = "out of memory",
    [SAFEPATH_LOOP]     = "too many symlink resolutions",
    [SAFEPATH_TOOLONG]  = "path component or symlink target too long"
  };
  const char *ret = "SAFEPATH_BAD_ERROR_CODE";

  if (err >= 0 && err <= (int) (sizeof str / sizeof str[0]) && str[err] != 0)
  {
    ret = str[err];
  }

  return ret;
}

int safepath_open(const char *name, int flags)
{
  int res = safepath_check(name);

  if (res == SAFEPATH_OK)
    return open(name, flags);

  set_errno(res);
  return -1;
}

int safepath_open_mode(const char *name, int flags, mode_t mode)
{
  int res = safepath_check(name);

  if (res == SAFEPATH_OK)
    return open(name, flags, mode);

  set_errno(res);
  return -1;
}

/* STDIO wrappers */
FILE* safepath_fopen(const char *name, const char *mode)
{
  int res = safepath_check(name);

  if (res == SAFEPATH_OK)
    return fopen(name, mode);

  set_errno(res);
  return 0;
}

FILE* safepath_freopen(const char *name, const char *mode, FILE *stream)
{
  int res = safepath_check(name);

  if (res == SAFEPATH_OK)
    return freopen(name, mode, stream);

  set_errno(res);
  return 0;
}